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Résumé : La thèse kuhnienne de l’incommensurabilité semble mettre en
cause le réalisme scientifique. Une réponse à cette mise en cause consiste à se
focaliser sur la continuité de la référence. La théorie causale de la référence,
en particulier, semble offrir la possibilité d’une continuité de la référence sus-
ceptible de fournir une base pour l’espèce de comparabilité entre théories que
requiert le réaliste. Dans « baptiser et rebaptiser : la vulnérabilité des dési-
gnations rigides », Kuhn attaque la théorie causale et l’essentialisme auquel
cette théorie est liée. La position de Kuhn est défendue par Rupert Read et
Wes Sharrok [Read & Sharrok 2002b]. Dans cet article, j’examine les argu-
ments présentés par Kuhn, Read et Sharrok, et je montre qu’ils ne fournissent
aucune raison de douter ni de la théorie causale, ni de l’essentialisme.
Abstract: Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis seems to challenge scientific re-
alism. One response to that challenge is to focus on the continuity of reference.
The causal theory of reference in particular seems to offer the possibility of
continuity of reference that would provide a basis for the sort of comparability
between theories that the realist requires. In “Dubbing and Redubbing: The
Vulnerability of Rigid Designation” Kuhn attacks the causal theory and the
essentialism to which it is related. Kuhn’s view is defended by Rupert Read
and Wes Sharrock [Read & Sharrok 2002b]. In this paper I examine the ar-
guments presented by Kuhn, Read, and Sharrock and show that they provide
no reason to doubt either the causal theory or essentialism.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (1), 2004, 39–71.
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1. The challenge of incommensurability and the ref-
erentialist response
Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis tells us that there is an important
difficulty in translating between the scientific terminology of theories
from either side of a scientific revolution. Even where the terminology
looks the same — the same words are employed — their meanings have
changed, so that they no longer express the same concept. Considered
as two homophonic terms, the one term does not translate the other.
Prima facie this is unwelcome to realists. One of the ways in which
science progresses is by correcting the mistakes of earlier scientists. We
once thought the Earth to be at the centre of the universe, orbited by
the planets, whereas we now know that the Earth is not at the universe’s
centre, but is itself a planet orbiting the Sun; it was once thought that
water is an element, but we have since discovered that it is a compound;
the idea that new species have evolved has displaced the old mistaken
view that species are immutable. And so on. But if the new theories
and those they replace do not mean the same things by the terms they
use, it looks as if we cannot straightforwardly say that the later theory
denies what the earlier one asserts, in which case we cannot say that it
represents a correction to and improvement on the earlier theory.
However, on further reflection the realist does have a way of defend-
ing the idea that later science genuinely corrects (and so rejects) some
parts of earlier science. The realist can say that whatever else may have
changed, the reference of the key scientific terms has remained constant.
We use our scientific terms to talk about things, kinds, properties, quan-
tities and so forth. This ‘talking about’, a relationship between words or
phrases and things in the world is the relationship of reference. And ref-
erence is what is important to truth (and falsity). For it is the properties
of the stuff water that determine whether or not it is an element. Conti-
nuity of reference therefore allows later scientists to say things that are
incompatible with what earlier scientists had said, where ‘incompatible
with’ means ‘not true at the same time as’. Boerhaave used the term
‘aqua’ in his Elementa Chemiae (1732), Lavoisier used ‘eau’ in his Traité
élementaire de chimie (1789), and Berzelius used ‘vatten’ in his Lärboki
Kemien (1808-18 to 1843-48). They ascribed different and incompatible
properties to what they were talking about. Various accounts of ref-
erence makes it both possible and plausible that nonetheless they were
referring to the same substance and hence that the later chemists were
able to correct their predecessors.
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The idea that reference is a key concept in assessing the progress of
science and that there has been a large measure of referential continuity
over time, even over revolutions, I shall call referentialism. Although it
is not their view, Read and Sharrock nicely encapsulate the importance
of referentialism to realism thus:
There is only one world, and the Realist (unlike the Relativist or Idealist)
can have coherent things to say about our deepening knowledge of that
(one) world, because we (all of us, especially via scientists) are always in
touch with the world. We are in touch with it through our naming of bits
of it, and our growing knowledge about the nature of what we name. It
may that at different times people had radically wrong ideas about the
nature of the world — they may have thought, for example, that water
was a primitive element — but, through being in contact with bits of the
world (e.g. with water), and through naming it, they always had some kind
of ‘basis’ to their claims. We can connect with them and what they said,
because there are direct (albeit long) chains of connection — linguistic and
(more generally) ‘causal’ — between their use of these words and our use
of them. They may have ‘meant’ something very different by their words,
but the reference of their words was just the same as our reference for the
same words. Reference — and in particular a causal theory thereof — will
settle the problem which meaning poses. [Read & Sharrok 2002, 153].
If referentialism is correct, the challenge presented by Kuhn’s incommen-
surability thesis is rather weaker than at first appeared. As Read and
Sharrock continue, the realist thinks that ‘Kuhn is wrong, because he
thinks that incommensurability of meaning is important and deep. It is,
in fact, completely shallow and unimportant, once one understands that
the real reference for natural kind terms remains continuous over time
and through ‘revolutions’.’
Given such a consequence for Kuhn’s thesis, it was natural that
Kuhn should reject referentialism. Kuhn thus argues against it in his
paper “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designa-
tion” [Kuhn 1990a] and his view is defended and elaborated by Rupert
Read and Wes Sharrock [Read & Sharrok 2002].
This paper aims to defend the referentialist view expounded above
so very clearly by Read and Sharrock against the criticisms that they
and Kuhn level against it. They also criticize the related thesis of essen-
tialism, and I shall also defend this.
The aim of this paper is thus not to criticize Kuhn’s incommensura-
bility thesis. Rather it is to show how the referentialist and essentialist
can mount an effective defence against the specific criticisms of Kuhn,
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Read, and Sharrock. If such a defence is successful, then the thesis of
incommensurability may be thought to present no interesting challenge
to the realist. The realist can regard incommensurability and realism
as consistent. Of course, there are other reasons one might have for
doubting realism, and these may even be part of a more broadly Kuh-
nian framework. These issues will not be my concern here. My concern
is limited to articulating a defence of the referentialist versions of real-
ism against the specific criticisms raised by Kuhn, Read and Sharrock.
Mounting this defence does not require therefore that I defend realism
in general. This will be important because the referentialist defence of
scientific realism against the apparent threat of incommensurability is
itself thoroughly realist. For example, the referentialist defence takes it
that there is a world of independently existing entities studied by science
and that we are able to refer to such entities. The referentialist defence
is easiest to express if we assume that scientists can get to know things
about such entities, although I do not believe that this assumption is an
inevitable part of the referentialist defence. That referentialism makes
realist assumptions is no failing, since the context in question is the de-
fence of realism, not the larger issue of whether realism is superior to
anti-realism.
2 Referentialisms and essentialism
Read and Sharrock regard the position they describe as a ‘kind of essen-
tialism’. This is misleading, for although essentialism is closely bound
up with questions of reference, it is an entirely distinct view from ref-
erentialism. A property which is essential to a kind is a property such
that no entity could be a member of that kind without possessing that
property1. So ‘being mammalian’ is an essential property of the kind
horse since nothing could be a horse without being a mammal. Histori-
cally essences have been held to come in two varieties, nominal and real
essences. A nominal essence of a kind K is a property that an object
belonging to the kind possesses in virtue of the verbal definition of the
term ‘K’. The real essence of a kind derives instead from the nature of
the kind. The presupposition of the idea of a real essence, whereby a
kind can have an essential nature, is that the kind in question has a real,
natural existence. One could regard some random collection as the mem-
bers of some kind defined for that purpose (e.g. the kind K is defined
as having exactly, the Eiffel tower, my desk, and the number nine as its
1This may only be a necessary condition of being an essence, not a sufficient one.
See [Fine 1994].
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only members, the kind L is defined as comprising all and only objects
that are either cubes or are coloured red). Such kinds could be regarded
as having nominal essences (necessarily something is L iff and only if it
possesses the property of being either red or cubic). But clearly such
kinds do not have a nature distinct from their nominal essences, and so
they do not have real essences distinct from their nominal essences.
In its most general form, essentialism is the view that there is a
non-trivial distinction between essential and non-essential (accidental)
properties. However, a more specific conception of essentialism takes it
that there is a non-trivial distinction between real essences on the one
hand and on the other hand firstly accidental properties and secondly
merely nominal essences. Thus on the more specific conception there
exist natural kinds with real essences and not in every case are these real
essences identical to or immediately derivable from the nominal essences
and the verbal definitions of the kind terms2. This kind of essentialism
may be extended to incorporate real essences of natural properties and
individuals also. Since the features constituting the real essence derive
form the nature of a kind (property, individual) rather than from its
verbal definition, and because the nature of a kind may be hidden from
us, revealed only by a posteriori, scientific investigation, it may be the
case, hold many essentialists, that in some instances a real essence may
be uncovered only by empirical investigation and cannot be known a
priori.
In what follows, I shall reserve the term ‘essentialism’ for the more
specific thesis, that there is a non-trivial conception of real essences.
Since referentialism is a thesis about words while essentialism is a
thesis about things and their metaphysics, it should be clear that they
are not the same thesis. Indeed referentialism as I have characterised it
is consistent with the denial of essentialism. A term ‘K’ may continue to
refer to a kind K over time without its being the case that all Ks share
a real essence. This is true of the artificial kinds K and L introduced
above. Members of those kinds share a nominal essence but not a real
essence. Referentialism per se does not require the existence of natural
kinds.
One reason for wanting to divorce referentialism from essentialism is
that within referentialism there are different views about how reference
works and while some of these are closely associated with (although not
2An essentialist of this kind might maintain that the real essence reflects a kind’s
real definition. But then the real definition and the verbal definition need not be the
same.
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identical to) essentialism, other views about the working of reference are
not so associated. I shall discuss the two main versions of referentialism:
(a) the Fregean version, employing a concept of sense which determines
reference, and (b) the Kripke-Putnam version, employing a causal or
non-Fregean, externalist conception of reference determination. Only
the latter is closely related to essentialism.
3 Fregeanism and the first referentialist response
One way of expanding on referentialism as characterised above is to em-
ploy Frege’s famous sense-reference distinction [Frege 1892]. According
to this view a term has associated with it a sense (Sinn or intension).
What exactly Fregean senses are or ought to be is a matter of dispute,
but the following aspects of sense are central:
(i) the sense of a term determines its reference (Bedeutung, extension);
(ii) the senses is grasped by someone who understands the term in
question.
A common way of thinking about sense is as a set of descriptions such
that (i)* something is the reference of the term if and only if it satisfies
those descriptions, and (ii)* someone who understands the term believes
those descriptions to hold of the reference of the term. Of course a
speaker may have many beliefs about the reference of a term she uses,
and not all those beliefs will be part of the sense of the term. The beliefs
associated with the sense will be true analytically and will be knowable a
priori. For example someone might propose that the sense of ‘human’ is
‘rational animal’. If that is correct then since sense determines reference,
all and only rational animals will be humans, and because senses are
grasped by speakers, everyone who understands the term ‘human’ will
believe (perhaps only tacitly) that humans are rational animals; the
latter proposition will be true analytically and will be knowable a priori.
One feature of the Fregean view that will be important later is a
consequence of the combination of (i) and (ii). Let T1 and T2 be terms
with different references. Then, by (i), T1 and T2 must have differing
senses. By (ii) we may expect the beliefs of a subject with respect to
the reference of T1 to be different from their beliefs with respect to
T2. (Strictly, the range of analytically true, a priori known, beliefs of
the subject will differ). Conversely, two subjects who are identical in all
respects, differing at most in ways about which they are entirely ignorant
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(e.g. differing in aspects of their environment beyond their ken) will use
terms with the same sense and so the same reference.
The Fregean view provides a referentialist response on behalf of the
realist to Kuhn’s incommensurabilist challenge. Several terms may have
different senses but share the same reference. In Frege’s example, ‘Venus’,
‘Hesperus’, Phosphorus’, ‘the morning star’, ‘the evening star’ are all
terms that refer to one and the same planet; but, arguably, they have
different senses. This means that the realist can accept Kuhn’s claim
that the meanings of terms change through revolutions so that a word
used after a revolution does not translate the same word as used before
the revolution. For translation requires preservation of sense. So the
realist will say that there is translation failure, because sense is not pre-
served through a revolution. Nonetheless, because terms with different
senses can have the same reference, the reference may well have remained
the same. And it is plausible to think that typically reference is indeed
preserved — or at least that scientists intend reference to be preserved
— because scientists very often want to add to beliefs and correct beliefs
about the same things that they were previously interested in.
Two things should be noted. First, the Fregean view shows that in-
commensurability and referentialism (and so realism) are consistent, only
so long as incommensurability is a thesis about change in senses/intensions.
Were it the thesis that reference changes, then Fregeanism would be of
no help. Secondly, even if incommensurability and referentialism are
consistent, that fact does not prove that there is indeed continuity of
reference. I shall make some remarks about each of these in turn.
The precise nature of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is a matter
of debate, not least because it changed over time. However, it is clear
that it is a thesis primarily about meaning in a sense that is much closer
to Frege’s Sinn than his Bedeutung. For example, incommensurability
is often characterised as the thesis that terms from distinct paradigms
(e.g. from either side of a scientific revolution) may fail to translate one
another. Translation requires preservation of sense (Sinn, intension).
So incommensurability as untranslatability is a thesis about a change in
the sense of a term. The incommensurability thesis, at least in its earlier
incarnation, is a consequence of the widespread theoretical-context view
of the meaning of theoretical terms. The latter is also a thesis concern-
ing the sense of those terms, not their reference. There are two further,
related reasons for thinking that the incommensurability thesis concerns
sense rather than reference. First, a corresponding thesis concerning
Fregean reference (Bedeutung) is much less plausible than a thesis con-
cerning sense. Prima facie, it is plausible that when there is a scientific
46 Alexander Bird
revolution the shift in theories, practices and so on means that words
acquire a new sense, that they cannot directly translate their predeces-
sors, and that there are barriers to perfect communication. But the idea
that a later theory is referring to different kinds and entities from its
predecessor is much less plausible. Often, it is true, a new theory might
initiate reference to an additional set of kinds and entities. So the discov-
ery of the structure of DNA permitted talk of new entities (base pairs,
for example). But substances being referred to beforehand were still be-
ing referred to afterwards (DNA itself, for example). In other cases, old
terms that failed to refer are given up (e.g. phlogiston), but in such cases
also, this is against a background of continued reference (to air, water,
iron, iron calx, muriatic acid, and so forth). Indeed if there were signifi-
cant discontinuity in reference one would wonder why the phenomenon
should be thought of as a scientific revolution as opposed to simply a
change in subject matter (such as a change from physics to zoology).
Since the idea of incommensurability as a shift in reference is at least
prima facie implausible, it would need powerful arguments to support
it. Kuhn does not provide such arguments — what he does say provides
much better support for the incommensurability thesis understood as a
change in something akin to sense.
The second reason Kuhn would not have thought of incommensura-
bility as a shift in reference is that reference (as Fregean Bedeutung) is
the sort of realist notion that Kuhn either eschewed or rejected. Kuhn
rejected the ideas of truth and increasing nearness to the truth on the
basis that they employed an illegitimate notion of what is ‘really there’
[Kuhn 1970a]. But the function of reference is precisely to make a con-
nection between our words (and thoughts) and what is really there. Now
it is true that Kuhn does say the following, when discussing the common
proposal that “Apparently, Netwonian dynamics has been derived from
Einsteinian, subject to a few limiting conditions.”:
[T]he physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts [spatial position,
mass, time] are by no means identical with those of the Newtonian con-
cepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian
is convertible with energy. Only at low relative velocities may the two be
measured in the same way, and even then they must not be conceived to
be the same) [Kuhn 1970a, 101-102].
This passage is puzzling if Kuhn’s ‘physical referent’ is taken to be the
same as Frege’s Bedeutung. For then the passage would imply that there
exists in the world both of two distinct quantities, Newtonian mass and
Einsteinian mass — and that Newton as talking about one and Einstein
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about the other. But that is implausible — why should we think that
the world contains both of these two different quantities? And if there
really is Newtonian mass in the world, doesn’t that mean that Newton
was right after all (about ‘Newtonian mass’)? No, either there is no
mass as referred to by Newton (the term ‘mass’ as used by Newton is
like ‘phlogiston’ as used by Priestley) or there is mass as referred to by
Newton — it is the same as the quantity referred to by Einstein, only
that Newton had some false beliefs about it (the term ‘mass’ as used
by Newton is like ‘Mars’ as used by Ptolemey). This passage becomes
much less puzzling if we do not take ‘physical referent’ as Bedeutung,
but rather to mean something like ‘what scientists took themselves to be
referring to’ or ‘what scientists believed about the intended reference’.
This would give us an ‘internal’ sense of reference, so that in this sense a
term can have a physical referent, even if there is no physical quantity in
the world corresponding to it. Furthermore, the ‘physical referent’ of a
term, in this sense, will change if there is a theoretical shift (for the simple
reason that what scientists believe about the intended reference changes).
It might be that Kuhn thinks of incommensurability as a change in
‘reference’ understood in this sense. But then the incommensurability
thesis does not, on its own, represent any threat to scientific realism
(which is the issue under discussion), for the realist can accept that
there is a change in ‘physical referent’ understood in Kuhn’s internalist
way (just as the realist can accept a change in sense) while continuing
to assert that there can be continuity in reference to a genuine quantity
or entity in the world.
It is important to be clear about what the referentialist claims the
Fregean position would show, if true. It shows that it is possible for sense
to change (leading to untranslatability) while reference is preserved. It
does not guarantee that reference is indeed preserved. There could be
cases where the sense associated with a term T at some time deter-
mines reference R1 but after a revolution the sense associated with T
has changed and now picks out a different entity, R2. Thus the Fregean
version of referentialism is consistent with the view that there is discon-
tinuity of reference. Therefore, all that the Fregean view would show,
if correct, is that continuity of reference and so scientific realism are
consistent with incommensurability (interpreted as a shift in something
like sense). The appeal to Fregean referentialism is thus only a defence
against an incommensurabilist critique of realism; it does not on its own
show that the realist view must be correct.
Could the incommensurabilist critique be supplemented to show that
revolutionary shifts in intension are also accompanied by shift in refer-
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ence? I have already suggested that any argument to the effect that
there are shifts in reference would have to be more powerful and de-
tailed than anything Kuhn has supplied. I shall return to the issue of
reference shifting later at the end of §4. More plausible on a Kuhnian
version of Fregean referentialism is that there will reference failure rather
than discontinuity of successful reference.
Consider the possibility that the sense of T at time t1 involves very
many beliefs — {B1}. As a result of a revolution the sense of T changes
significantly, so that at a later time t2, the beliefs — {B2}— constituting
the sense of T are very different. Since the sets {B1} and {B2} are both
large and significantly different, there is a considerable danger that the
same things will not satisfy both sets, and hence that reference is not
preserved. Even so, this will not involve a genuine shift in successful
reference. If the earlier set {B1} is large, constituting most or all of the
scientists’ beliefs about T at t1, then there it is likely that nothing will
satisfy {B1} and so T has no reference and T will not exist. And indeed
we may expect this to be the case, since we are interested in scientific
revolutions. Given that there is a revolution involving a change in beliefs,
precipitated by anomalies or other kind of failure of the scientists’ beliefs
at t1, that suggests that indeed the beliefs {B1} cannot all be true, in
which case T cannot refer.
This outcome, whereby there is reference failure (as opposed to shift
in successful reference) is the result of combing a Fregean view with
the contention that the sense of a term is very ‘thick’, involving a large
number of beliefs. What is significant is that during the period preceding
the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the standard view
about the meaning of scientific terms was that all parts of a theory in
which a term is employed contribute to its meaning. So all the beliefs
encapsulated in a theory would contribute to the term’s sense, making
it very thick indeed.
In so far as we are still concerned with genuine, external reference,
such a position is unattractive. It is unattractive to the realist, since
widespread reference failure is in tension with the initial characterisation
of realism as being committed to the improvement in beliefs about the
same things. (At the same time is also incompatible with the view that
there are shifts in genuine external reference. But this position need
not be unattractive to the ‘internal reference’ view discussed above).
So for the realist, the Fregean version of referentialism ought optimally
be supplemented with arguments as to why the sense of the relevant
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scientific terms is likely to be thin and not thick3.
It is worth pointing out that the Fregean view had troubles of its
own. One source of trouble was Quine’s influential argument that the
analytic-synthetic distinction is empty. If Quine were right the whole
notion of Fregean sense is misconceived, for one could not distinguish
between those propositions or beliefs that constitute the sense of a term
and those that do not. A rather different source of trouble for the Fregean
view came from Kripke and Putnam [Putnam 1975a] [Kripke 1980]. Read
and Sharrock suggest that they developed their ideas ‘in part specifically
in opposition to this idea of Kuhn’s’. (The idea of Kuhn’s in question
was that the world changes as a result of a scientific revolution, which
can be understood as the claim that scientific revolutions generate taxo-
nomic incommensurability). Although Putnam and Kripke did not have
world-changes or incommensurability as their primary target when they
formulated their views, it is true that they and realist philosophers of
science who were interested in such matters realised the significance of
this version of referentialism.
4 Kripke, Putnam, and the second referentialist re-
sponse
What Kripke and Putnam were primarily concerned to combat was the
combination of the central Fregean claims, (i) and (ii) above. They held
that it is not the case that reference is determined solely by ‘what is
in the head’ of a speaker, such as the speaker’s beliefs. Hence nothing
can satisfy both (i) and (ii), and so reference is not fixed by a Fregean
sense. This is established by Putnam’s famous twin-earth argument.
The key idea is that it is conceivable that two subjects O1 and O2 can
be internally exactly alike yet when O1 uses a term T it has a reference
that is different from the reference of the same word T used by O2. What
does differ between O1 and O2 is their environment — but the differences
in their environments are differences of which they are unaware. Thus it
would appear that a set of beliefs or a Fregean sense is not sufficient to fix
reference. Something else, something external to O1 and O2, something
in their environment of which they are ignorant, plays a part also. In
Putnam’s argument we consider two worlds E and TE. E is the actual
world while TE is a world exactly like E, except that where E has H2O
TE has a distinct compound XYZ that nonetheless shares the same
3For a detailed discussion of the relationship between Fregean intensionalism and
incommensurability, see [Bird 2000, 163-178].
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superficial qualities as H2O (smell, taste, boiling and freezing points,
ability to support life, etc.). Consider the year 1950. O1 uses the term
‘water’. In so doing O1 refers to H2O but not to XYZ (it is a truth
about the actual world that water is H2O, and not XYZ). Since E and
TE are symmetrical we must say that O2 in TE when using the term
‘water’ refers to XYZ and not H2O. Ex hypothesi E and TE are alike
except for the difference between H2O and XYZ. And so whatever O1
believes concerning what he calls ‘water’ O2 also believes, concerning
what he calls ‘water’. So their beliefs about ‘water’ do not distinguish
them — they both believe that the following sentences are true: ‘water is
important for life’, ‘rain and snow are constituted from water’, ‘sodium
chloride dissolves in water’ and so forth, and there is no sentence such
that one believes it and the other does not. If Fregeanism were true,
then the sense of ‘water’ used by O1 and the sense of ‘water’ used by O2
must be the same — by (ii) in §3 above. And so, by (i) the references
must be the same. But we have seen that the references are not the
same. So Fregeanism is false.
The question is then raised, what is it that fixes reference if it is not
a Fregean sense, if it is not a set of beliefs in the head of the speaker?
A common answer, but not the only possible answer, is that it is some
kind of causal connection between the speaker’s use of the term and the
reference. Why is it that when using the term ‘water’ O1 refers to H2O
but not to XYZ, while O2 refers to XYZ but not to H2O? The suggested
answer is that O1 is causally connected to H2O but not to XYZ and
vice-versa for O2. O1 acquired the use of the term ‘water’ when as a
child his parents said ‘this stuff is water’ pointing to the stuff coming
out of the tap when O1 was having a bath. That stuff, being in the
world E, was H2O. In the corresponding learning situation, O2’s parents
pointed to stuff that came out of the bath-tap on TE, which is XYZ.
This allows a referentialist response to incommensurabilism that is
different from the Fregean one. The referentialist can say that what-
ever else changes during a scientific revolution, the causal connections
between the scientists (and their use of words) and the things in the
world do not change. Their beliefs may change radically, but what those
beliefs are about will not change, because that relation, the referential
relation, is not fixed by beliefs but by a causal connection that remains
in place. O1 may grow up to have all sorts of strange beliefs about water
and these may change a great deal, but they are still all beliefs about
water, the stuff that is H2O, because the causal connection between his
use of the term ‘water’ and the stuff water (H2O) was established before
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and independently of those beliefs4.
Because on the causal view of reference-fixing, reference is fixed inde-
pendently of beliefs, the causal view does not fall prey to the objections
to the Fregean view. For example, it doesn’t matter much if one wants
to say that much or all of a theory is part of the ‘meaning’ of some
scientific term, because any such conception of meaning cannot be one
where meaning determines reference. And it is reference that is signifi-
cant in being able to say that a later theory corrects an error in an earlier
theory, or in saying that later scientists know more about some subject
matter than did earlier scientists. As regards the realism debate, the
idea of meaning becomes insignificant, as does the incommensurabilist
thesis that there is meaning change of a kind that precludes translation5.
It should be noted that a pure causal theory of reference (only the
causal connection counts — theoretical beliefs play no part), is not the
only account of reference consistent with the Kripke-Putnam rejection of
Fregeanism. Mixed accounts will do also, and there are other accounts
where a causal connection is not always required.
It is intriguing to note that at one point Kuhn himself took a very
similar view:
The distinction between a theoretical and a basic vocabulary will not do
in its present form because many theoretical terms can be shown to attach
to nature in the same way, whatever it may be, as basic terms. But I
am in addition concerned to inquire how “direct attachment” may work,
whether of a theoretical or basic vocabulary. In the process I attack the
often implicit assumption that anyone who knows how to use a basic terms
correctly has access, conscious or unconscious, to a set of criteria which
define that term or provide necessary and sufficient conditions governing is
application [Kuhn 1974, 467 footnote 11].
Here Kuhn seems to be rejecting a Fregean approach to reference and
endorsing one that allows for a direct attachment to nature (i.e. not via
a set of criteria or descriptions), of the kind that Kripke and Putnam
promote. However, as we shall see, Kuhn later rejected and attacked
the Kripke-Putnam approach. It is interesting to ask why Kuhn’s view
changed. I speculate that Kuhn was not conscious of a change and that
4What would be required for a change in the reference of O1’s term ‘water’ would
not be a change in O1 beliefs, but a change in O1’s causal connections with kinds of
stuff. So if O1 were moved, unknowingly, to TE or a TE-like place, his new causal
contact with XYZ may mean that in due course O1 might be referring to XYZ with
the term ‘water’ and no longer to H2O.
5For a discussion of the causal theory and its variants in relation to incommensu-
rabilism see [Sankey 1994a] and [Bird 2000, 179-181].
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the difference in view represents a difference in intended contrast, a dif-
ference in date of writing, and a difference in emphasis of research. The
passage quoted is a footnote to a 1974 paper on paradigms, which were
the focus of his early work. One of the key elements in the paradigm idea
is to oppose the view that scientific deliberation is a matter of employing
rules. In extending this idea to the role of paradigms in conferring mean-
ing on terms, it is natural to claim that meaning is not specified by rules
(e.g. correspondence rules, criteria, necessary and sufficient conditions
etc.) but instead may be conferred other means, for example, by direct
attachment. Later, however, Kuhn’s focus turned much more towards
incommensurability, and in this context the idea of direct attachment
looks unwelcome since it would undermine incommensurability in the
way described, and hence is appropriate for attack in the 1990 paper
[Kuhn 1990a].
Earlier I mentioned that the Fregean account of referentialism does
not guarantee continuity of reference. It is possible for the sense con-
nected with a word to change sufficiently that its reference changes also.
Nonetheless, the dialectical relevance of Fregean referentialism is that
it shows how incommensurability and scientific realism can be consis-
tent. Thus, as it stands, incommensurability does not threaten scientific
realism, if the Fregean view is right. To show that it does, one would
additionally need to show that the relevant shifts in sense were sufficient
to yield shifts in reference also (but without involving reference failure).
Similar remarks may be made with regard to the version of referentialism
based on the causal theory of reference. There can be continuity of causal
connection, and so continuity of reference, even though there are changes
in the theory associated with a term. So again, while some version of the
thesis of incommensurability (e.g. concerning the impossibility of trans-
lation) might be true, it would still be consistent with scientific realism6.
That is enough to remove the immediate threat posed by incommensu-
rability. The causal theory of reference does not itself guarantee that
there will always be continuity of reference. Even on this theory it is
possible for the reference of a term to change. It has been said that the
name ‘Madagacar’ was originally applied to the mainland of Africa by
those who lived there, but European explorers misunderstood their in-
terlocutors and applied it to the large island that now bears that name.
The use of the name in connection with the island by those explorers
and their successors forged a new causal connection between the name
6It might be mentioned, however, that the causal theory of reference, in making
do without the notion of sense, casts some doubt upon there being a problem of
translatability.
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and the island and it is this use we have inherited. Now, it is conceiv-
able that something like this could happen in science. One could argues
that Democritus’ ‘atom’ has a different extension from ours7. But plau-
sible cases are few and far between. What is required is that there is
an established causal link to one reference or extension and that a new
causal link is forged to another reference or extension. Although Kuhn
mentions ‘redubbing’ in the title of his paper, he nowhere argues that
such shifts actually take place. To make out a case just the like the
‘Madagascar’ case, one would have to show that the later scientists mis-
took the intentions of the earlier scientists. That is a possible scenario,
but on the whole one might judge it to be unlikely. Elsewhere he does
assert that there have been changes in extension. For example, he argues
that the extension of ‘planet’ has changed, because before Copernicus
the Sun was held to be a planet but the Earth was not, whereas now we
take the opposite to be true. But this of course does not establish any
shift of extension rather than a shift in what the extension was thought
to be [Bird 2000, 160-162]. We are often wrong about extensions, and
we often disagree about them.
To conclude, the causal theory of reference does not itself guarantee
continuity of reference. It is conceivable that revolutionary changes in
science result in shifts of reference and extension of the ‘Madagascar’
variety. But it would take a lot more historical detail than Kuhn has
offered to make out such a case. As it stand, the causal theory shows how
there can be continuity of reference despite even revolutionary scientific
changes, and so shows how scientific realism is not threatened by the
thesis of incommensurability as Kuhn formulated it.
5 Criticising Putnam
The causal theory of reference and Putnam’s argument that gives rise to
it have come in for considerable discussion and criticism. I shall consider
here only criticisms related to our discussion of Kuhn.
The critic might first remark that it is unlikely that O1 and O2 have
analogous beliefs. After all (on E) it is widely known that water is H2O
(and correspondingly it will be known on TE that water is XYZ). If O1
and O2 share in this widespread knowledge then they will have distinct
beliefs, whereas the argument requires that they have isomorphic beliefs.
The most straightforward reply is simply to stipulate that in the example
7Although one might doubt where the extension of Democritus’ use of the term
is established by a causal connection, rather than via a sense.
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O1 and O2 do not have this knowledge. Although they may know that
substances are elements or compounds made up of elements in chemical
combination, they may not have had enough education to know which
compound water is. The objector might respond by suggesting that
what, for O1, fixes H2O as the referent of water, is the belief, widespread
in O1’s society on E, that water is H2O. This would still abandon the
letter of Fregeanism, since it would be no state of O1 that fixes the
reference of ‘water’. Nonetheless, it might be said to retain the spirit
of Fregeanism, since the proposal is, in effect, that senses exist but are
social rather than individual. A standard way of cutting through all
of this discussion is to turn our attention to the ancestors A1 and A2
of O1 and O2 respectively, who inhabit E and TE in 1750. Since this
date is before the discovery of the chemical constitution of water, the
beliefs of A1 and A2 are isomorphic as are the beliefs of A1’s society
and A2’s society. There is no reason to suppose that the reference of
‘water’ has changed between A1 and O1 — what we refer to as water is
the same stuff as what our ancestors in the eighteenth century referred
to as water. Similarly A2 and O2 are referring to the same stuff. Thus
A1 is referring to H2O and A2 is referring to XYZ. And so once again
we have a difference in reference without any difference in belief, and so
without a difference in sense — whether individual or social.
Kuhn’s primary response to Putnam is to point out that the existence
of XYZ is chemically impossible — at least, it is incompatible with what
modern chemistry tells us. Let us define ‘water-like’ thus. Something is
‘water-like’ if it has the superficially observable properties of water (it is
a tasteless, colourless substances, boils at 100◦C, freezes at 0◦C, support
life etc.) Thus according Putnam’s story, XYZ is water-like but is not
water. Kuhn points out that unless modern chemistry is badly wrong,
it is not possible for there to be a water-like substance that is not H2O.
There can be no water-like XYZ, unless XYZ is H2O after all. So the
envisaged scenario is impossible, as far as we know. But were it possible,
then modern chemistry is wrong, and hence the discovery on TE that
water is XYZ would prompt a scientific revolution. Consequently, even
if O2 were untouched by this, the (scientific) society which surrounds
him would be very different from that surrounding O1.
I find it difficult to see what the relevance of Kuhn’s response is sup-
posed to be. The causal theory and essentialism have both been placed
under close and critical scrutiny by analytic philosophers. But Kuhn’s
arguments have been ignored even by the most stringent critics of Kripke
and Putnam. In my view this is because Kuhn seemed to have a tin ear
for the sort of philosophical argument that is standard in modern phi-
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losophy (though less common in philosophy of science than elsewhere).
Nonetheless, Read and Sharrock have sought to resurrect Kuhn’s ar-
guments. They say “[Kuhn] is raising a fundamental difficulty for the
essentialist/referentialist view. He is saying: ‘If we try taking Putnam’s
example seriously it turns out that Putnam does not really offer up a
tenable thought-experiment after all’.” [Read & Sharrok 2002b, 154].
Let us reflect on what Putnam’s example is supposed to be and do.
Read and Sharrock call it a ‘thought-experiment’. If it is a thought-
experiment, it is a thought-experiment not in chemistry but in the phi-
losophy of language. It is intended to show us how particular words and
expressions function. In particular it is designed to show what does and
what does not fix the reference of our natural kind terms. It does this
by getting us to reflect on a particular imaginary scenario, and eliciting
our judgments about what the kind terms used by the imaginary people
in that imaginary scenario refer to. The ‘data’ yielded by the thought-
experiment are those judgments (that O1 refers to H2O while O2 refers
to XYZ). Those judgments license the inference that our implicit un-
derstanding of the function of kind terms is that they do not have their
references fixed by a speaker’s beliefs. Since we are competent users of
the English language we may be expected to have a reliable implicit un-
derstanding of the function of various categories of expression in English
and so we may infer that in fact kind terms do not have their references
fixed by a speaker’s beliefs.
Does Putnam’s imaginary scenario have to be a possible scenario for
it to do its work? No it does not. Putnam is not telling us that XYZ is
possible. He is asking us to imagine that it is possible. Remember that
the relevant data are our judgments about what the imaginaryO1 andO2
are referring to in the imaginary scenario. So for the thought-experiment
to do its work it is necessary only that the scenario be imaginable. And
here ‘imaginable’ need be taken only in a very weak sense. We want to
elicit judgments from ourselves and others in response to the imaginary
scenario, and for that we need only think that the scenario is possible.
Even if in fact it is impossible, that is no obstacle to our imagining that
it is possible or to entertaining the scenario. And there are certainly
conceptions of ‘imagine’ that allow this. For it is perfectly coherent to
imagine even mathematical impossibilities being possible. For one can,
in the relevant sense, imagine its being possible to trisect any angle.
Say one were doing a study concerning what mathematical propositions
people find interesting or surprising. It is perfectly coherent to try to
elicit a judgment from someone by asking, “Imagine that you could trisect
any angle. Would you find that an interesting or surprising possibility?”
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It is no objection to such a study that it is impossible to trisect the
angle. Nor is it at all relevant that if it were possible to trisect the angle,
then modern mathematics would be badly wrong and discovering that
one could trisect the angle would lead to a revolution in mathematics.
6 Defending Putnam
Although the above is an entirely sufficient response to Kuhn’s comment,
I also suggested that in order to bypass all such considerations we could
imagine Putnam’s scenario being discussed in the early to mid nineteenth
century [Bird 2000, 183]. The idea is this. The discovery that water is
H2O was a development that emerged in the first half of the nineteenth
century, with the most important steps being taken in the period be-
tween 1804 and 1820, thanks initially to Dalton and then to Berzelius.
However, at that time chemistry was in a sufficiently nascent state that
it is plausible to suppose that Berzelius and his contemporaries could not
be sure that there is no distinct compound that shares the superficial
properties of water. We now have to imagine some forerunner of Putnam
carrying out his thought experiment in 1850. We elicit the same judg-
ments, that in using the term ‘water’ O1 on E is referring to H2O while
O2 on TE is referring to XYZ, even though the beliefs they have are the
same (remember that O1 and O2 do not know much chemistry). How-
ever this time, it is not open to a putative forerunner of Kuhn’s to object
that there could be no such XYZ that has the superficial properties of
water but is a different compound.
Read and Sharrock respond to this proposal as follows:
But this just seems incoherent: it seems that now there no longer is a
thought-experiment. For how are we supposed to know that water is H2O
if we cannot rule out that some water is XYZ, if we cannot rule out XYZ as
a starter in the game? And we cannot rule out the latter unless (e.g.) we
know that XYZ cannot have the surface properties of water (. . . ). Unless
and until one has a good scientific reason for insisting water’s extension
cannot include XYZ, one will not need to endorse Putnam’s ‘externalist’
conclusion. Kuhn’s point is: such good scientific reason is ‘only’ in fact
given by the taxonomic etc. structure of modern chemistry8.
This argument is not entirely clear. But it seems to be saying the fol-
lowing:
8See [Read & Sharrock 2002, 154] (emphasis in original).
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(1) to know that water is H2O one must know that no XYZ can be
water-like (i.e. no substance other than H2O can have the surface
properties of water);
and hence:
(2) on my assumption that in 1850 they did not know that there is no
water-like XYZ, they did not know then that water is H2O;
and so:
(3) because in 1850 they did not know that water is H2O they could
not then have run Putnam’s thought experiment.
If this is a correct interpretation, then the Read and Sharrock argu-
ment errs in three important respects: (i) it fails to understand Putnam’s
argument; (ii) it seems to assume precisely what Putnam’s argument is
intended to disprove; (iii) it contradicts what chemists and historians of
chemistry themselves say.
(i) Read and Sharrock seem to think that by moving the thought
experiment to 1850 I have undermined Putnam’s thought-experiment.
Whereas the experiment is possible in 1950 it is not possible in 1850.
This is because in 1950 we knew there can be no water-like XYZ, which,
ex hypothesi, we could not know in 1850.
But this is wrong. It plays no part in Putnam’s though experiment
that we know that there can be no water-like XYZ. On the contrary,
Kuhn’s criticism is in part that Putnam failed to notice that accord-
ing to modern chemistry there can be no water-like XYZ. The thought
experiment works just as well in 1850, because those who run the exper-
iment will be able to judge (or so Putnam and I expect) that individuals
whose contact is with XYZ and not with H2O will be referring by ‘water’
to XYZ and not to H2O.
(ii) Read and Sharrock assume in (1) above that knowing that water
is H2O requires knowing that nothing other than H2O has the surface
properties of water. Why do they think this? The only reason I can think
of is that they take the surface properties of water to be definitive of what
water is. Something is water if and only if it has the surface properties
of water. From this it would indeed follow that water is H2O only if
nothing other than H2O can have the surface properties of water. But
the idea that something is water if and only if it has the surface properties
of water is precisely the idea that Kripke and Putnam are trying to
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undermine. Remember that O1 and A1 know only about the surface
properties of water (and correspondingly for O2 and A2, concerning what
they call ‘water’). So if the reference of the term ‘water’ were fixed by
their beliefs about water, then it would be fixed by beliefs about surface
properties alone. But since, as the thought experiment aims to show,
reference is not fixed by their beliefs, it follows that what water is cannot
be defined solely in terms of its surface properties. So when Read and
Sharrock assume in their criticism that water can be defined in terms of
its surface properties alone, they assume what Putnam sets out to show
is false. They beg the question against him.
(iii) Let us look more closely yet at the assumption (1) that knowing
that water is H2O requires knowing that nothing other than H2O has the
surface properties of water. That means that either (a) Berzelius (who
died in 1848) did not know that water is H2O, or (b) Berzelius did know
that nothing other than H2O could have the surface properties of water.
But neither of these propositions is true. Berzelius certainly thought he
knew that water is H2O, and certainly historians of chemistry attribute
that knowledge to him. But there is no reason to suppose that Berzelius
ever gave serious thought to the question, could something other than
H2O have the surface properties of water, and there is even less reason
to suppose that he did or could have known such a thing. In the quoted
passage, Read and Sharrock seem to be saying that to know that water
is H2O, one must know that nothing other than H2O is water-like, and
that this knowledge must be based on good scientific reason, of the kind
that only modern chemistry provides. (I presume from the context that
‘modern’ means twentieth or twenty-first century). But again that is
false. As I have said, coming to know that water is H2O, as Berzelius
and his contemporaries did, did not require thinking about what other
than H2O could be water-like.
How did chemists come to know that water is H2O? The important
work in showing that water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen was
carried out by Lavoisier, although similar experiments were carried out
at the same time by Cavendish, Priestley, and Monge. The experiments
were of two kinds: those that synthesized water, and those that anal-
ysed water by decomposition. In 1781 all the above-mentioned chemists
found that the burning of ‘inflammable air’ (hydrogen) produced what
they recognised as water. None seemed to ask whether water might be
compounded of quite distinct substances. (Of course, water could be
produced by other processes, such as the reaction of inflammable air
with metallic calxes. But that just confirmed Lavoisier’s view that the
calxes contained oxygen). However, they could have had no theoreti-
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cal reason for supposing that no other compound could produce a sub-
stance indistinguishable from water. (One hundred years later one could
argue the point thus: to be water-like a substance must either be com-
posed of small molecules, with strong inter-molecular forces, or of large
molecules. All small molecules are known, and the only water-like one
is H2O. Larger ‘molecules’ are either crystals (including metals) or are
organic compounds, all of which are not water-like. But such thoughts
were not available to Lavoisier and his contemporaries). Quite probably
there was an unstated background assumption that distinct compounds
would have distinct observable properties, which implies that if the ox-
ide of hydrogen is water-like, then nothing else would be. But such an
assumption could hardly have been sufficiently well grounded to provide
the ‘scientific good reason’ that Read requires for supposing that there
is no other compound like water. Instead of relying exclusively on such
an assumption, what clinches the identification of water as the oxide
of hydrogen, is the dissociation of water by passing steam over heated
iron. Lavoisier showed that if one passed steam through a red-hot gun
barrel (and, in later experiments, over iron filings), the products were
inflammable air and a calx of iron, just like iron ore.
The analysis of water by decomposition removed any room for doubt
that the substance produced by burning inflammable air is water (al-
though the chemists seem to have shown little doubt on that score).
At the same time, the decomposition experiments were not by them-
selves conclusive for all (for example, Priestley hypothesized that the in-
flammable air had been contained in the iron). Of course, the synthesis
of water from hydrogen and oxygen and the decomposition of water into
hydrogen and oxygen, are experimental results that are logically compat-
ible with the view that the extension of ‘water’ includes everything that
has water’s surface properties. Thus those results are compatible with
a view which says that there could be kinds of water that are not com-
pounds of hydrogen and oxygen. It is instructive that neither Lavoisier
nor any of his contemporaries considered such a possibility. The fact
that their samples of water were a compound of hydrogen and oxygen
licensed the conclusion they drew: water is a compound of hydrogen and
oxygen. What is behind this license is not that they had good, specific,
scientific reasons for supposing that there is in fact no other substance
that has water’s surface features — for as we have seen, there were no
such reasons. Rather, those chemists all took it that their samples as well
as similar sources (i.e. the wells, rivers, rain etc. from which they might
have obtained, by distillation, other samples of water) were samples of
a single substance. That substance is water. The fact that they had not
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ruled out the possibility of a water-like substance on Mars that is not a
compound of hydrogen and oxygen was irrelevant, since that substance
was not a potential source of a sample. They would have had no inter-
action with that substance. A fortiori, the fact that they had not ruled
the possibility of synthesizing some water-like substance that might or
might not exist in nature was irrelevant too, since that substance too
was not a potential source of samples for them. It is true that Lavoisier
et al. might have been mistaken in supposing all their samples and po-
tential sources of samples to all be samples of the same substance. But
notice that the risk of their being mistaken in this assumption is much
less than the risk of being mistaken in the assumption that there is no
possible substance that is water-like other than their samples.
To sum up: we may make two contrasting hypotheses about what
Lavoisier et al. meant by ‘water’ (‘eau’ or ‘vatten’ etc.).
(i) The extension of ‘water’ is precisely whatever is water-like. (In
which case, in concluding that water is a compound of hydrogen
and oxygen, they were making the highly risky assumption that
there exists no other possible compound that is water-like and that
no such other compound could be synthesized).
(ii) ‘Water’ refers to that single substance of which all actual water-
samples and potential water-samples (i.e. rain, wells, rivers etc.
from which Lavoisier et al. could have obtained samples) are in-
stances. (In which case, in concluding that water is a compound
of hydrogen and oxygen, they were making the much less risky
assumption that their water-samples and potential water-samples
were all instances of a single substance).
The second of these hypotheses makes a much better explanation of
why Lavoisier, Dalton and so on, reasoned as they did. First, we know
that they did make the assumption ascribed to them in (ii). Indeed it is
an assumption common to all those interested in the chemistry of water
going back to Aristotle and before. But there is no evidence that they
made the assumption ascribed in (i). Secondly, if we take it that the
chemists in question were rational men, it is more plausible to attribute
less risky assumptions in their reasoning than more risky ones.
Putnam’s thought experiment is one way in which we can see that
the function of kind terms is to name a single kind, one with which we
are interacting. But it is not the only way. The way in which people
reason in actual circumstances is another source of argument. This is be-
cause people’s reasoning indicates their commitments and assumptions.
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And since use of a term involves certain assumptions and commitments
(e.g. concerning the extension of that term), reasoning using that term
can reveal which assumptions an individual is making, and hence can
reveal the function of a term. The reasoning of late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century chemists reveals a commitment to a Kripke-Putnam
view of natural kinds rather than a Kuhnian or Fregean one.
7 Essentialism
Earlier I separated referentialism from essentialism. The referentialism
of Putnam is however related to essentialism. Fregean referentialism held
that a term would pick out its referent by virtue of that referent satisfying
the sense of the term. Putnamian referentialism holds that certain terms,
including natural kind terms name their referents. This is an important
difference. For consider the propositions: ‘George Orwell wrote political
novels’ and ‘George Orwell is Eric Blair’. Clearly the former might not
have been true had circumstances turned out differently. But the latter
cannot but be true, however things might have been. Since ‘George
Orwell’ and ‘Eric Blair’ are names of one and the same man, the sentence
‘George Orwell is Eric Blair’ simply says of a certain man that he is
identical to himself. Since nothing can fail to be itself, under any possible
circumstances, it is necessarily the case the George Orwell is Eric Blair.
The Putnamian view does not deny that the Fregean way of refer-
ring might be true for some terms — it just denies that it is true for
all terms (specifically, it isn’t true for natural kind terms and proper
names). Something like the Fregean view might be right for expressions
such as ‘my favourite colour’, ‘the nearest planet to Earth’ etc.9 Such
terms might have picked out different objects had matters been other-
wise, and indeed they may pick out different objects at different times.
The difference between terms that pick out the same objects under all
possible circumstances and those that may pick out different objects, is
marked by saying that the former are ‘rigid designators’. It is not only
names of people and natural kinds that are rigid designators. Let us as-
sume for illustration that a person could not have had different parents
from the parents he or she does in fact have. Therefore, since ‘Auberon
Waugh’ designates the same person under all possible circumstances, so
does ‘the father of Auberon Waugh’, and the latter is a rigid designator
also. Now consider ‘The father of Auberon Waugh is Evelyn Waugh’.
Since this is true the terms ‘the father of Auberon Waugh’ and ‘Evelyn
9Russell, however, went on to deny that properly speaking these are referring
expressions at all. Instead they are disguised forms of quantification.
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Waugh’ pick out the same man. Since those terms are rigid designators,
they each pick out the same man in all possible circumstances. And so
‘the father of Auberon Waugh’ and ‘Evelyn Waugh’ pick out the same
man in all possible circumstances. Hence ‘The father of Auberon Waugh
is Evelyn Waugh’ is necessarily true. Looking at this another way, just
as in the case of ‘George Orwell is Eric Blair’, the proposition says of a
particular man that he is identical to himself, which of course cannot be
anything but true.
The lesson of all this for natural kinds is as follows. We have already
seen that ‘water’ functions like a name and so is a rigid designator. The
same may be said, for the same reasons, of ‘hydrogen’ and ‘oxygen’ and
of the chemical symbols ‘H’ and ‘O’. The chemical expression ‘H2O’ is
clearly not a name in the ordinary sense. But like ‘the father of Auberon
Waugh’ ‘H2O’ is a rigid designator, since there is just one substance that
can be a compound of hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio 2:1. Since it
is true that water is H2O, then ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ designate the same
substance, and since those terms are rigid designators, they designate
the same substance under all circumstances. Hence ‘water is H2O’ is
a necessary truth. Note that in reaching this conclusion all that was
assumed was (i) that water is H2O and (ii) that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are
rigid designators, being names or functioning like names.
That it is necessary that water is H2O lends support to the view
that water has an essence, namely that it is H2O. Locke tells us that the
essence of something is some property such that something could not be
that thing without possessing that property. And because necessarily
water is H2O, it is indeed the case that something could not be water
without being H2O.
The same conclusion can be reached in a slightly different way from
Putnam’s arguments. Those show that natural kind terms such as ‘wa-
ter’ function as names, picking out a natural kind. So the extension
of the predicate ‘is water’ includes all and only samples of that kind.
What makes something a sample of a particular kind? There is room
for some debate on this, but one thing is sure, and that is that members
of the same kind must bear some deeper similarity than mere superficial
resemblance. A robot cat would not be of the same kind as animal cats,
however convincingly it behaved as a cat, since a creature with copper
and silicon on the inside constructed by engineers does not belong to the
same kind as an animal of flesh and bones begat in the standard way by
its parents.
The clearest cases of entities all belonging to the same kind come
from physics, since all electrons are exactly alike and all protons are
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exactly alike and so on. So the kinds ‘electron’ and ‘proton’ are perfectly
homogeneous. Moving on to chemistry we find that the kind terms
have inhomogeneous extensions. This is because atoms and molecules
might be in different states of excitation, and because of the existence
of isotopes. Thus not all H2O molecules are identical. Nonetheless they
all belong to the same chemical kind. It is plausible to suppose that
‘sameness of kind’ may be fixed contextually. Thus what is meant by
‘same kind’ by chemists is fixed by their interests as chemists. Their
interests do not extend to the differences between isotopes since these
make no qualitative difference to chemical reactions. Thus to answer
the question posed by Kuhn, ‘is heavy water really water?’ is ‘yes it is’
[Kuhn 1990a, 312]10.
There are other ways in which samples of what we ordinarily call
water are not all the same. Much of what we call water contains consid-
erable quantities of what is not H2O. Seawater, dishwater, rain, mineral
water and so forth all contain differing amounts of impurities. For this
reason I stated the essentialist conclusion thus: ‘in all possible worlds
water consists (largely) of H2O’. Read and Sharrock pick up on my use
of ‘largely’ here. They ask whether essentialism would look so attrac-
tive if the impurities included XYZ, in significant proportions (say 25%)
[Read & Sharrock 2002, 156]. They are right to raise this point. The
primary response must be to refer to my proposal that the sameness
of kind relation is contextual. In the chemical context, the impurities
found in seawater, rain etc. would not be permitted and to the extent
that something contains anything other than H2O it is not a perfect
sample of water. So if we are thinking of the chemical term ‘water’
then I was mistaken in including the parenthetical ‘largely’. Chemical
water is in all possible worlds only H2O. On the other hand the exten-
sion of our everyday term ‘water’ does include these impure samples.
We should conclude that the term ‘water’ as used by the chemist is a
different term from the same word ‘water’ as used in everyday English.
Interestingly, the extension of everyday ‘water’ does not cover samples
that may have just as high a proportion of H2O (tea, a tomato etc.).
So we cannot say that everyday water is just impure chemical water. It
seems that the extension of the everyday term is governed by a variety of
practical considerations that may not be characterised straightforwardly.
(Nonetheless, all these observations are consistent with the hypothesis
that the practical considerations have the effect of modifying a core con-
10Kuhn also asks the corresponding question, ‘is deuterium hydrogen?’. Again the
answer is ‘yes’. Physicists distinguish protium, deuterium, and tritium as the three
isotopes of hydrogen.
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ception of water, that it is a single chemical substance. Those complex,
practical considerations would allow in samples with varying degrees of
impurity but not all. If so, it would remain the case that necessarily
everyday water is largely H2O. That said, since we are concerned with
the chemists’ water, this is not strictly relevant).
What if our samples of water had always had a large admixture of
XYZ? This would be significant, since, ex hypothesi, the XYZ would
contribute to the dominant superficial character of all the samples of
water, in a way that impurities do not. If our samples contained small
amounts of XYZ, then that too might be considered as a case of an
impurity. But a significant quantity of XYZ could not be so dismissed.
In such a case, if it is discovered that water samples contained not only
H2O but also XYZ, then we would have to admit that pure water is
not a single chemical kind but is a mixture of two compounds. And
it would certainly be plausible to argue that water has no real essence
(although some might reasonably argue that it is essentially a mixture
of H2O and XYZ). But the fact that the referent of ‘water’ might not
have a real essence in the hypothetical case where our samples are a
mixture of H2O and XYZ does not show that in the actual case, where
our samples are not such a mixture, that water is not essentially H2O.
Cases such as the hypothetical mixture of H2O and XYZ have been
discussed before. The classic case is that of jade, which comes in two
unrelated forms, jadeite and nephrite which are nonetheless superficially
similar (though not entirely similar). In this case it is clear that there
is no geological kind ‘jade’; what we call jade is a mixture of kinds. But
that does not mean that diamond, which does not have samples that are
of different constitutions, is not essentially a form of carbon. The point
can be seen most easily with respect to persons and the proper names
referring to them (where Kuhn is willing to admit a causal theory and its
consequences). Consider the following scenario: what one has taken to
be an individual named John is not that but is a pair of identical twins
who frequently substitute for one another. It may not be entirely clear
what the name ‘John’ does: does it refer to some disjunctive entity or
to the mereological sum of the individuals, or does it not refer at all and
are sentences using the name ‘John’ without a truth-value? But what
is clear is that the possibility of such a case does not impugn the causal
theory of reference and the necessity of ‘Eric Blair is George Orwell’.
Similarly the case of jade and the hypothetical case of a mixture of H2O
and XYZ does not give us any reason to doubt the application of the
causal theory to natural kinds and the necessity of ‘all water consists of
H2O’.
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8 Non-liquid water?
Kuhn also objects to Putnam’s identification of water and H2O on the
ground that H2O includes ice and steam whereas in 1750 ‘water’ picked
out only liquid water. Kuhn continues thus: “In 1750 the primary dif-
ferences between the species recognized by chemists were still more or
less those between what are now called the states of aggregation. Water,
in particular, was an elementary body of which liquidity was an essen-
tial property.” [Kuhn 1990, 311]. He goes on to say that the Chemical
Revolution in the 1780s is what gave us a taxonomic transformation
that allows a chemical species to exist in all three states. Read and
Sharrock amplify Kuhn’s comments, remarking, “It is only given our
post-Lavoisieric framework that we are forced to see water as largely
H2O. Absent that framework, ‘water’-in-all-its-states is not necessarily
a natural kind.” [Read & Sharrock 2002, 156].
These comments have very little impact on the essentialist argument
for three reasons. Firstly, they are historically inaccurate. Phase transi-
tions (changes of state) were widely regarded as changes in one and the
same species long before Lavoisier. Secondly, the fact some chemists re-
garded water, ice, and steam as different chemical species does not show
that the extension of their term ‘water’ has failed to include ice and
steam. Thirdly, even if ‘water’ as used in 1750 did not include steam,
essentialist conclusions may still be drawn.
Firstly, did scientists universally regard steam and water and differ-
ent species before Lavoisier? The matter is far from as clear as Kuhn,
Read, and Sharrock suggest. Aristotle tells us: “Now the sun, moving
as it does, sets up processes of change and becoming and decay, and by
its agency the finest and sweetest water is every day carried up and is
dissolved into vapor and rises to the upper region, where it is condensed
again by the cold and so returns to the earth.” He also tells us that
ice, snow, hail, are hoar-frost are water solidified by cold, that water
freezes in winter, and that ice is made up of water11. Locke starts by
appearing to confirm Kuhn’s view “If I should ask anyone whether ice
and water were two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should
be answered in the affirmative; and it cannot be denied but that he that
says they are two distinct species is in the right.” [Locke 1690, III, vi,
sect. 13]. But then he goes on to argue that someone brought up in
Jamaica who found that in England a bowl of water froze over might
regard the ice as hardened water and that “it would not be to him a
new species, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct
11See [Aristotle Meteorologica, 354b27-30, 388b14, 347b36, 385b5].
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species from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the
furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman.”
Locke draws a quasi-Fregean lesson, that the extensions of our species
terms are fixed by nominal essences. Remember that for Locke the real
essences that would distinguish between whatever real species there are,
are undiscoverable. He need not have drawn such a conclusion; he could
have held that whether water and ice really are the same or distinct
species depends on scientific facts unavailable to him and to his con-
temporaries12. What is important is that Locke does not regard it as
absurd or demonstrably false to think that ice and water and the same
species, and furthermore that he regards it as given that phase tran-
sitions for other substances (e.g. gold and jelly) are species-preserving,
and so for Locke (and presumably his audience) it cannot be, pace Kuhn,
that in general “the primary difference between the species recognized
by chemists were still more or less those between what are now called
the states of aggregation.”. It is worth noting that the demonstration by
Cavendish, Priestley and Lavoisier that water is a compound, by explod-
ing hydrogen and oxygen together seems to assume that water-vapour
and water are the same substance. For the product of combustion is
water-vapour which must be condensed to give liquid water which was
then subjected to confirming tests to show that it is water. If conden-
sation changed the actual substance, one could not identify water (the
liquid) with the compound of hydrogen and oxygen. (These statements
must be qualified by pointing out that even Lavoisier did not think that
strictly water and water-vapour are the same species, for water-vapour
is water combined with caloric).
What these remarks show is that before Lavoisier it was reasonable to
hold that different phases did not always differentiate between substances
(and that even after Lavoisier the matter was not fully settled until
the end of the caloric theory). In which case ‘gaseous water’ could not
simply be a contradiction in terms. Rather it was a synthetic question
whether freezing and evaporation involved a change in species13. The
fact that many chemists did regard such changes as changes in species is
no objection to essentialism. Indeed, as Kripke shows, a large part of the
motivation for the causal theory is that it permits false beliefs about the
12Note that Locke is working with an idiolect view of language — we each have our
own personal languages that we coordinate publicly. Without that, one might wonder
why the proper response to the Jamaican visitor would not be ‘you’ve misused the
word ‘water’; part of its definition is that it is a liquid’ — if, of course, water does
have only a nominal essence.
13For this point and much other useful information on the subject I am very grateful
to Robin Hendry.
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referents of the terms one uses. In the much-used fictional example, Lois
Lane believes that Clark Kent and Superman are different people. But
that is consistent with their being the same individual and necessarily so.
Similarly someone who recalls Eric Blair from their shared schooldays
at Eton might not know that he is the same man as George Orwell, the
now famous author of Down and Out in Paris and London, and indeed
might naturally think there are different individuals, in which case his
belief is a necessary falsehood.
It is noteworthy that Kuhn accepts the causal and essentialist story
when it comes to the use of property names. He is even willing to agree
that it comes very close to working just as precisely for some kind terms,
such as ‘gold’ [Kuhn 1990a, 309]. (It is worth asking whether Kuhn’s
partial acceptance of the causal-essentialist story is compatible with the
Wittgensteinian interpretation given by Read and Sharrock). To de-
fend his incommensurability thesis, what is required is that the story
break down for key terms across scientific revolutions, even if it holds
for others. Since water is a point of focus in the Chemical Revolution,
Kuhn wants to show that there isn’t continuity of reference of ‘water’
across that revolution, even though there may have been for ‘gold’ and
other kind terms that did not play such a central role. However, given
the partial acceptance of the causal-essentialist thesis, Kuhn needs to
have an especially convincing reason as to why what holds in the case
of names (and perhaps some kind terms) does not hold in the case of
‘water’. For in the case of names, we see that ‘N’ and ‘M’ might be rigid
designators referring to the same individual (hence necessarily N=M),
yet someone might believe that N and M are not identical. And the
same response is available to his objection based on the widespread (but
not universal) view, before 1750, that steam and ice are not water. For
the essentialist may (and should) respond that those involved had a false
belief: ‘steam’, ‘ice’, ‘water’ all refer to the same substance and always
have done. Those like Locke who thought otherwise were mistaken and
those like his fictional Jamaican who thought that ice is hardened water
were correct. The former would have been just as mistaken as someone
who, to borrow Locke’s example, thought that solid and liquid gold are
different substances (which Locke acknowledges they are not). Kuhn has
given no reason to reject this account of matters. As remarked above,
the causal theory of reference does not guarantee continuity of reference.
But it does make it more likely, even through revolutionary scientific
changes. To make out a case for discontinuity of reference or extension
Kuhn needed to give far more careful argument and detailed historical
support than he did provide.
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How damaging would it be were we to admit that ‘x is water’ did
analytically entail ‘x is liquid’ in 1750? I have suggested that this would
leave untouched the conclusion that all water1750 is H2O even though
it would not be correct to say that all substances that are composed of
H2O are water1750 (where water1750 is what was being referred to by
‘water’ when used in 1750) [Bird 2000, 183-184]. For we can form the
expression ‘liquid water’ where our term ‘water’ covers all three phases.
And thus if water1750 is necessarily liquid water and water is essentially
H2O, then water1750 is also essentially H2O.
Kuhn complains that if we are required to use descriptive terms in
the specification of reference then we are back with the Fregean posi-
tion that the causal theory was designed to avoid. But the cases are
importantly different. For if we supplement the rigid designation with
descriptive terms, the essentialist conclusions still follow. In Putnam’s
arguments the problem was the insufficiency of a purely descriptive se-
mantics for kind terms; his conclusions are thus consistent with a mixed
causal-descriptive semantics (an approach which for many philosophers
has supplanted the pure causal view while retaining its insights).
What is important in all this is whether the incommensurabilist
threat to realism survives. Kuhn has not given us a reason to suppose
that it does. Indeed it is questionable whether the incommensurability
thesis itself survives. I have suggested that Kuhn’s arguments against
the view that our term ‘water’ is the same as or translates the mid-
eighteenth century term ‘water’ (in the mouths of scientists) are very
weak (even less does he show that the terms have different references).
But note that in the course of his arguments that there is no such equiva-
lence Kuhn supplies an alternative translation: ‘water’ (as used in 1750)
is translated by ‘liquid water’ (as used by today’s scientists) and has
the same reference as ‘liquid H2O’. He concedes that modern science
is capable of picking out the stuff that people in 1750 labelled ‘water’
[Kuhn 1990a, 312]. If so, then the realists have what they want, a way of
making clear that what scientists today say is in contradiction to some
of what scientists in 1750 were saying. They thus are able to explain
how, if today’s scientists are right, science has corrected and added to
the science of yesteryear.
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9 Superficial properties are essential?
Kuhn regards the following argument as significant.
The so-called superficial properties are no less necessary than their apparent
essential successors. To say that water is liquid H2O is to locate it within an
elaborate lexical and theoretical system. Given that system, as one must
be in order to use the label, one can in principle predict the superficial
properties of water (just as one could of those of XYZ), compute its boiling
and freezing points, the optical wavelengths that it will transmit, and so
on. If water is liquid H2O, then these properties are necessary to it. If they
were not realized in practice, that would be a reason to doubt that water
really was H2O [Kuhn 1990, 312-313].
Again Kuhn overstates the scientific and historical case. The theoretical
framework required to state that water is (liquid) H2O was in place by
the time of Berzelius in the mid-nineteenth century. But that framework
was not sufficient to permit Berzelius to make the calculations Kuhn
refers to, even in principle. The theoretical framework required to be
able to assert that water is (liquid) H2O is much thinner that Kuhn
supposes.
But Kuhn’s remarks are in any case once again irrelevant. The su-
perficial properties would be necessary if the laws of nature contained
within the relevant theories and used to compute the details of boiling
point, freezing point, and so on, are themselves necessary. But if the
laws are contingent, then it is much more difficult to show that the su-
perficial properties are necessary. Most philosophers of science have held
the laws of nature to be contingent and have taken it that the superficial
properties are correspondingly also contingent.
Now, it is possible for contingent laws to support necessary superficial
properties. But the arguments are subtle and highly contentious, and
have only recently been explored [Bird 2001], [Bird 2002]. Kuhn gives us
no reason to think that with contingent laws the superficial properties
will be anything but contingent too. Some philosophers do think that
the laws of nature will be necessary. In which case, given the necessity of
water=H2O the superficial properties will be necessary also. Again this
view is contentious and Kuhn hasn’t said anything relevant to it. Finally,
even if the superficial properties are necessary, as Kuhn maintains, that
doesn’t show that they are essential. For as Kit Fine reminds us, the
essence of an entity is much more restricted than the set of its necessary
properties [Fine 1994]. We may thus distinguish between the essence of
a substance and the non-essential but nonetheless necessary properties
that follow from its essence.
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10 Conclusion
We started by considering the apparent threat to scientific realism posed
by Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. The common response by the re-
alist is to appeal to referentialism. Referentialism shows how incom-
mensurability as a thesis about the mutual untranslatability of theories
emanating from different paradigms is after all consistent with scientific
realism. The referentialist response has been elaborated in particular in
the form of the causal theory of reference. Related to the causal theory
(but by no means identical to it) is the thesis of essentialism.
Essentialism and the causal theory of reference have come in for con-
siderable criticism, and the arguments are still live today. I have not
discussed let alone deflected any of these criticisms here. In this paper I
have considered only the criticisms brought to bear by Kuhn and elabo-
rated by Read and Sharrock (which are very different from the criticisms
usually discussed in the literature). Do their arguments provide some
distinctive reason to doubt the causal theory of reference and essential-
ism, and thereby undermine the referentialist defence of scientific realism
against the threat posed by the incommensurability thesis? Did Kuhn
spot something that other philosophers have missed?
Despite the best efforts of Read and Sharrock to resurrect Kuhn’s
criticisms, the fact is that Kuhn did not fully understand Putnam’s ar-
gument and his criticisms are largely irrelevant. Those criticisms do not
give the scientific realist a reason to doubt her views. Of course there are
other reasons that have been advanced for doubting scientific realism and
these have not been under consideration here. Furthermore, Kuhn’s own
approach is itself an anti-realist one14. This creates difficulty in assessing
Kuhn’s criticisms of referentialism. For in so far as referentialism is a
component of scientific realism, a criticism that assumes an anti-realist
viewpoint is question-begging. For that reason, I have not considered
Kuhnian ways of adding to the points he makes, that together present
an alternative, inherently anti-realist viewpoint. For example, Putnam’s
arguments are framed in such a way that assumes that scientists can get
to know the way things really are. While I do not think that the argu-
ments need to be framed in an overtly realist manner, I have not here
responded to criticisms of a Kuhnian sort that object to the realist way
of framing the argument. For what we are considering here is the refer-
14Indeed, on some ways of understanding Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, the ar-
gument is from anti-realism to incommensurability rather than the other way around.
For a discussion of the relationship between anti-realism and incommensurability see
[Bird 2003].
71
entialist defence of scientific realism against an alleged criticism. And it
is clearly legitimate for the realist to frame her defensive arguments in
realist terms.
Given this dialectic, it needs to be repeated that the primary aim
of the paper is limited to defending the referentialist version of realism
against a particular set of criticisms, and not to defending realism against
other kinds of criticism, let alone establishing the superiority of realism
to its competitors. The primary aim is achieved so long as referential
continuity remains an open possibility at the end of this paper. I have
not sought to show that there definitely is referential continuity across
revolutions in key cases. This would require more detailed historical work
than I can present here, although I do suggest that the historical details
presented in the case of ‘water’ point in this direction. That additional
work would be required to show the superiority of the realist viewpoint,
and that, as I have said, is not my current aim. The latter is limited
to showing how referentialism can support realism and defending the
causal version of referentialism against Kuhn’s specific criticisms. The
conclusion I reach is that the realist can mount a fully adequate defence.
